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Burying Best Interests of the Resulting 
Child: A Response to Professors Crawford, 
Alvaré, and Mutcherson 
I. Glenn Cohen†
I am gratified by the very kind remarks of Professors 
Crawford,
 
1 Alvaré,2 and Mutcherson3 in their separate respons-
es to Regulating Reproduction4 and Beyond Best Interests,5
 
†  Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. Co-Director, Petrie-Flom 
Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics. J.D., Harvard 
Law School. Igcohen@law.harvard.edu. I thank Bridget Crawford, Helen 
Alvaré, and Kim Mutcherson, not only for their excellent responses to my pa-
pers, but for comments on my reply to those papers. Lisa Sullivan provided 
outstanding research assistance. Copyright © 2012 by I. Glenn Cohen. 
 es-
pecially since each of them writes work that I greatly admire 
and often rely on. Because I view responses like this as a 
means of crystallizing and helping to resolve disagreements, I 
focus here on those points where our views diverge rather than 
the issues on which we agree. However, I do not want to give 
the misleading impression that our points of disagreement are 
more significant than our points of agreement. If anything, I 
think the opposite is true. 
 1. Bridget J. Crawford, Authentic Reproductive Regulation, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES 31 (2012), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/05/CrawfordFinal.pdf. 
 2. Helen M. Alvaré, A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen’s Regulating 
Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 
8 (2012), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Alv 
areFinal.pdf.  
 3. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, In Defense of Future Children: A Response 
to Cohen’s Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 46 (2012), 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/MutchersonFinal.pdf. 
 4. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best In-
terests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011) [hereinafter Cohen, Regulating Reproduc-
tion]. 
 5. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187 (2012) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Beyond Best Interests]. 
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I.  PROFESSOR CRAWFORD   
I am very grateful to Professor Crawford for her kind 
words about the descriptive and normative contributions of my 
Articles, as well as her attempts to simplify and clarify some 
parts of my argument that are somewhat weighed down by the 
philosophical language I use. 
In reflecting on one of the three alternatives to Best Inter-
ests of the Resulting Child (“BIRC”) I examine in Regulating 
Reproduction,6
It might take shape as follows: an intervention is justified if the likely 
number of children who may or may not come into existence if the in-
tervention is in place is less than the likely number of children who 
may or may not come into existence if the intervention is not in place. 
In other words, the likely population-wide aggregate of actual harm to 
actual children is lower with the intervention in place. If this reading 
of Professor Cohen’s analysis is correct, then perhaps he could be 
(mis)interpreted to justify reproductive interventions that cause over-
all fertility rates to decline. It is not entirely clear that this is his 
view, however, and this aspect of the argument might be developed or 
clarified in future work.
 the distinction between what I call perfect and 
imperfect Non-Identity Problems, Professor Crawford notes it 
is “somewhat difficult to understand,” stating: 
7
Again, this is quite complex terrain, so I am grateful to 
Professor Crawford for highlighting an area of relative obscuri-
ty in my writing. Let me try to clarify: in cases of what I call 
“perfect” Non-Identity Problems, such as prohibiting brother-
sister incest or reproduction by women over age 50, if the regu-
latory intervention succeeds it will necessarily alter when, 
whether, or with whom individuals reproduce, thereby creating 
a Non-Identity Problem in that the same child will not come in-
to existence with and without the intervention in place. By con-
trast, in the category of what I call “imperfect” Non-Identity 
Problem, such as prohibitions on sperm-donor anonymity or egg 
sale, in theory the population of children who come into exist-
ence with and without the intervention in place may share at 
least some members. Imagine, for example, that Jason and To-
ny are both seeking to use eggs provided by another individual. 
Imagine that in one state of the world (i.e. in one possible 
world) egg sale is permitted and in another egg sale is prohibit-
ed. Jason’s egg provider is willing to provide the egg even if not 
paid, while Tony’s egg provider is only willing to sell. If it is the 
case that Jason’s egg provider will provide the exact same egg 
 
 
 6. I consider an additional four in Beyond Best Interests. See generally id. 
 7. Crawford, supra note 1, at 36 (citations omitted). 
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at the exact same time to Jason such that it is fertilized with 
exactly the same sperm whether or not egg sale is permitted, 
then we can say there is no Non-Identity Problem, and thus no 
problem as to using BIRC arguments to argue for a prohibition 
on egg sale as beneficial to Jason’s offspring. There remains a 
Non-Identity Problem as to Tony’s offspring, preventing us 
from relying on BIRC justifications, though, because, as to To-
ny, the prohibition on egg sale will alter when, whether, or with 
whom he reproduces. One possible BIRC alternative I consider 
is to restrict the use of BIRC arguments to cases like sperm-
donor anonymity and egg sale where there may be some chil-
dren who come into existence whether or not the regulation is 
put in place. Nevertheless, I do not find this approach particu-
larly persuasive, at least as to the set of examples I canvass, 
because while the regulation burdens all parents, it is only jus-
tifiable on BIRC grounds for a small and hypothetical subset of 
children who will come into existence as the same children 
whether or not the intervention is put in place. If the world 
were full of Jasons and not Tonys, things might be different, 
but if most of those who will be regulated are like Tony, the 
regulation is much harder to justify. For more on why I think 
this, I refer readers back to the relevant section of Regulating 
Reproduction.8
Professor Crawford points to my writing that “the natu-
ral/artificial line [as to types of reproduction] ought to carry no 
weight. I suspect that views to the contrary are the product of 
misfires of intuitions on positive versus negative liberty; they 
are misfires because both preventing access to reproductive 
technology and preventing coital reproduction are negative lib-
erty violations.”
 
9 She worries that “[t]he reader, however, likely 
persists with a misfiring intuition, as it is not immediately ob-
vious that the state’s failure to fund assisted reproduction is a 
negative liberty violation” and that “[s]uch a result appears to 
obtain only to the extent that there is a constitutional right to 
become a genetic parent by any means necessary, not merely a 
generalized right to become a genetic parent.”10
When we are talking about decisions of the state to fund 
 This is a help-
ful issue for her to raise, in that it shows I have not put my 
point as clearly as I might have. Let me try to do better:  
 
 8. Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 4, at 474–81. 
 9. Crawford, supra note 1, at 40 (quoting Cohen, Regulating Reproduc-
tion, supra note 4, at 495). 
 10. Id. 
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reproductive technology, we are indeed discussing positive-
liberty rights to become genetic parents. Professor Crawford 
correctly observes that, in prior Articles, I have carefully dis-
tinguished such positive-liberty rights from negative-liberty 
rights to become genetic parents.11 In the passage in question, 
by “preventing access to reproductive technology,” I meant reg-
ulations such as those preventing unmarried individuals, 
LGBT individuals, or those over age fifty, for example, from 
purchasing reproductive technology services out of pocket. I did 
not mean a rights claim on the state to pay or otherwise pro-
vide those services, which I agree are positive-liberty interven-
tions. Thus, to restate my point more clearly, those who hew to 
a line distinguishing natural and artificial reproduction are 
mistakenly confusing the natural/artificial line with the line 
between positive- and negative-liberty claims to become a ge-
netic parent. Preventing those who are unmarried, LGBT, or 
older from buying reproductive technology services is as much 
of a negative-liberty infringement as is preventing the coital 
reproduction of the same groups. Of course, whether we ought 
to believe that those individuals should, as a normative or con-
stitutional matter, have a negative-liberty right to become a 
genetic parent through assisted reproduction, and whether that 
right is a fundamental or more garden-variety one, is some-
thing I did not dwell on in these Articles.12
Professor Crawford’s suggestion that I “might elaborate 
beneficially on the difference between interventions that make 
access to reproductive technology difficult, on the one hand, 
and interventions that prevent access to reproductive technolo-
gy, on the other” is well-taken.
 Instead, in this 
work, I merely want to suggest that even if one believes nega-
tive-liberty rights as to assisted reproduction deserve less pro-
tection than their coital equivalent, the state still needs a real 
and defensible justification to impinge on such rights. 
13
 
 11. I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140–41 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Rights Not to Procre-
ate]. 
 I try to get at this somewhat as 
to my ordering of the means of regulating reproduction from 
the most to the least intrusive and my suggestion that stronger 
justifications are needed for the more intrusive ones. But she is 
certainly right that it would be profitable to develop this fur-
 12. For some discussion elsewhere in my work, see generally id. and I. 
Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 
(2008). 
 13. Crawford, supra note 1, at 40–41. 
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ther. For now I will make the tentative suggestion that one way 
to do this would be to borrow from the Supreme Court’s abor-
tion jurisprudence since Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, and frame the question of whether the 
state has put in place (in negative-liberty terms) a “substantial 
obstacle” to reproduction.14
I am also extremely grateful for Professor Crawford’s sug-
gestions of how my work in these Articles bears on the question 
of whether surrogacy payments should be taxable, an area she 
has enlighteningly discussed in her earlier writings.
 That said, I am well aware of the 
dissatisfaction that test has engendered in abortion litigation, 
so I would want to think (and hope others will as well) more 
carefully about this issue before offering anything more con-
crete. 
15
II.  PROFESSOR ALVARÉ   
 In these 
Articles I have suggested a few reproductive-rights debates for 
which my approach would reframe the debate, but, as Professor 
Crawford shows with her tax example, the implications extend 
much farther than I have mapped. 
Professor Alvaré’s response to my two Articles, like all of 
her work, is elegant in both its writing and underlying ideas. 
As she recognizes, I am careful to suggest that rejecting BIRC 
arguments for the reasons I set out (primarily in Regulating 
Reproduction) does not imply that “there is no rationale availa-
ble to the state for regulating the circumstances of concep-
tion.”16 In Regulating Reproduction and Beyond Best Interests I 
consider seven substitute justifications, each of which I exam-
ine thoroughly.17 Professor Alvaré’s paper adds what potential-
ly might be an eighth justification. She suggests that the regu-
lations I canvass might be “understood as an exhortation to 
parents, pre-conception, to ‘step up’ to a level of ‘fitness’ where-
by children’s best interests come first, and parents’ rights fol-
low only if they embrace this duty.”18
At conception, all the law can do is exhort (e.g., abstinence programs) 
or threaten with penalties (e.g., incest bans), or interpose practical 
hurdles (e.g., frighten off would-be sperm donors by requiring disclo-
 That is,  
 
 14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992). 
 15. Crawford, supra note 1, at 41–45. 
 16. Alvaré, supra note 2, at 17. 
 17. See generally Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 4; Cohen, 
Beyond Best Interests, supra note 5. 
 18. Alvaré, supra note 2, at 11. 
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sure) in order to begin to mold would-be parents into the kind of par-
ents it will assume them to be after the child’s birth: ‘fit’ parents who 
act in the child’s best interests.19
She suggests that this reformulation of the argument 
would “harmonize family law’s pre-conception and post-birth 
treatment of parents,” an intriguing idea.
 
20
The notion of shaping parents through a level of minimal 
fitness is a very alluring one. I think one might spin it in a se-
ries of possible directions, which might map onto one or more of 
my BIRC alternatives.  
 
The simplest interpretation would be to say that in the pre-
conception setting, “unfit parents are those who would produce 
children with lives not worth living.” As I have said in my Arti-
cles, that approach would not be problematic under BIRC since 
preventing the coming into existence of children who would be 
given a life not worth living is arguably in the interests of those 
children.21 However, as she recognizes, given that “few, if any, 
persons would like to be associated with the declaration that a 
particular child’s life is ‘not worth living,’” this argument will 
not be usable to justify most forms of reproductive regulation.22
What else might Professor Alvaré’s fitness approach mean? 
At some points, her argument sounds very much like a virtue-
ethics one. In virtue-ethics approaches, an action is right if the 
action is one that a virtuous moral agent would characteristi-
cally perform under the circumstances.
 
23 Thus, one way to un-
derstand the idea that Professor Alvaré is pushing is that the 
regulations of reproduction I canvass are aimed at enforcing a 
vision of parental virtue. She writes that “the BIRC rationale 
makes sense as a public and private effort . . . to remind par-
ents, before the moment parenting begins (conception) to be 
what the law later (after-birth) needs them to be and assumes 
that they are: fit parents who act in their children’s best inter-
ests.”24
 
 19. Id. at 12. 
 In this regard she sounds very much like a proponent of 
Rosalind McDougall’s virtue-ethics take on parenting. McDou-
gall argues that “the primary purpose of a parent is the flour-
 20. Id. at 11. 
 21. See Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 4, at 472–74. 
 22. Alvaré, supra note 2, at 9. 
 23. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 65–
76 (2006); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. 2007), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
 24. Alvaré, supra note 2, at 15. 
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ishing of his or her child,” and thus there “seems to be some-
thing unparental about an agent who creates a child with no 
chance of flourishing, purely to satisfy his or her own desire to 
have a child.”25 But, as I suggest in Beyond Best Interests,26 this 
kind of approach merely pushes the question back one level, 
causing us to ask why the state is pressing this concept of pa-
rental virtue and whether the state is justified in using the 
means of regulating reproduction that it does in order to 
achieve this end. Or, to use Professor Alvaré’s nice phrasing, 
why does the law need the parents to “be fit parents who act in 
their children’s best interests”?27
The answer cannot be “because those children will be better 
off,” at least as to pre-conception decisions, because this would 
just reincorporate BIRC arguments that, as Professor Alvaré 
recognizes, I have shown are problematic due to the Non-
Identity Problem. Why else might we want to emphasize pre-
conception fitness then? One reason hinted at by Professor 
Alvaré (I am not sure intentionally or otherwise, so I will em-
phasize this is my reading of some things she says) is that, be-
cause the state has a justified parens patriae interest in the pa-
rental fitness of parents post-conception, it is entitled to impose 
those same requirements pre-conception to achieve desired 
post-conception behavior. This idea might, in turn, be taken in 
one of two directions, each having different implications.  
 
First, one might move away from a focus on society-level 
mores and instead focus on the individual resulting children. 
Thus, by screening for parental fitness in family form, age, or 
the like, we are preventing harm to the child once he exists, 
given those (by hypothesis) more pathogenic parenting envi-
ronments. As I explain in Regulating Reproduction, this kind of 
interpretation is one that fails to completely wrap its head 
around the Non-Identity Problem. If the only way of protecting 
the child who would have come into existence from negative 
post-conception parental activities is to cause him not to exist 
(either because no child comes into existence or another child 
comes into existence in his place), we have “protected” him out 
of existence in a way that cannot be justified by harm- or bene-
fit-based rationales.28
 
 25. R. McDougal, Acting Parentally: An Argument Against Sex Selection, 
31 J. MED. ETHICS 601, 603 (2005). 
  
 26. Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 5, at 1271–72. 
 27. Alvaré, supra note 2, at 15. 
 28. I deal with this most explicitly in Regulating Reproduction in my dis-
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The second interpretation is that while law professors and 
philosophers can nicely separate out pre- and post-conception 
behavior and the very different effects of this kind of harm, the 
average person will not do so, such that, in order to maintain a 
strong norm of parental attention to the best interests of exist-
ing children, we must be overbroad and sweep in parental atti-
tudes about pre-conception activities as well. The pre-
conception attitudes are not themselves problematic, but they 
are inexorably linked to the post-conception ones, and therefore 
we cannot (if you will pardon the pun) Solomonically split the 
baby. To justify the regulation on this ground would therefore 
depend on an empirical claim that we cannot optimally enforce 
the post-conception regime Professor Alvaré has in mind with-
out also enforcing the pre-conception regime. It is possible this 
empirical claim can be cashed out, but the very inconsistency in 
the extent of both pre- and post-conception regulation Professor 
Alvaré identifies makes me somewhat skeptical that the two 
are so closely linked. Even if they were linked, one would need 
to defend a further normative claim that the benefit gained in 
better inculcation of the post-conception parental virtues justi-
fies the incursion on pre-conception procreative liberty that is 
being reigned in, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the 
post-conception regime. Is it possible that one might defend 
both the empirical and normative claim? Perhaps, though I 
have my doubts. Even if one could defend both claims, my 
guess is that the imperative this argument would generate 
would be a fairly weak one. It might justify only the least in-
trusive means of regulating reproduction, such as information-
al interventions or refusals to affirmatively subsidize certain 
reproductive decisions, but not something like the criminaliza-
tion of brother-sister incest or prohibition of anonymous sperm 
donation. 
There are still other ways to understand Professor Alvaré’s 
parental fitness approach, which might fall under what I call 
the Non-Person-Affecting Principle approach or the Reproduc-
tive Externalities approach. In Regulating Reproduction and 
Beyond Best Interests, I deal with both approaches in some de-
tail,29
 
cussion of Axel Gosseries’s “Last Judgment” proposal. Cohen, Regulating Re-
production, supra note 
 but I will refrain from repeating that analysis here and 
just refer readers to that discussion, especially because my own 
4, at 479 n.168. 
 29. Id. at 481–513; Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 5, at 1217–
44. 
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sense of Professor Alvaré’s response paper and her larger body 
of work is that neither would be an approach she would find at-
tractive. 
III.  PROFESSOR MUTCHERSON   
Like much of her writing, Professor Mutcherson’s response 
shows a passionate, empathetic, and deep focus on the experi-
ence of the disadvantaged. As with all the commentators, I 
think that Professor Mutcherson and I agree about more than 
we disagree. I am grateful that her response focuses on where 
she perceives we diverge, since it greatly enriches the dis-
course. I will take the same course, highlighting three main ar-
eas of disagreement. I will then press Mutcherson on what the-
ory of reproductive regulation she endorses. Before I do so, 
though, let me start by identifying some broad areas of agree-
ments. 
First, I think we agree that the reasoning of most of the 
courts that have rejected wrongful life liability—that children 
have not been harmed by being brought into existence if given 
a life worth living—is directly in tension with BIRC reason-
ing.30
 
 30. That said, Professor Mutcherson notes a single case from 1984, 
Procanik v. Cillo, which she cites to claim “where there is no companion 
wrongful birth claim, at least one court has determined that a wrongful life 
claim could stand, thus suggesting that the calculus being done by these 
courts is a bit more complex than Cohen admits.” Mutcherson, supra note 
 
3, at 
58 (citing Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984)). However, the actual 
holding of the court is that “an infant plaintiff may recover as special damages 
the extraordinary medical expenses attributable to his affliction, but . . . he 
may not recover general damages for emotional distress or for an impaired 
childhood.” Procanik, 478 A.2d at 757. Thus, the case seems to be rejecting the 
claim that the child was harmed in denying the infant general damages, but 
gives him the damages the parents would have had through a wrongful birth 
lawsuit, which are different both conceptually and in monetary amount from 
what he would be entitled to in a wrongful life lawsuit. It is the harm from be-
ing born that tracks the BIRC problem, not the extraordinary medical expens-
es of raising the child. In any event, even if there really were cases giving chil-
dren true wrongful life compensation when there was no one to assert a 
wrongful birth lawsuit, it would not count as strong evidence against my claim 
for two reasons. First, while it is understandable that courts want to help chil-
dren with impairments by bending the law this way, the logic is problematic, 
and it is also underinclusive in that there are many children with comparable 
impairments who cannot claim negligence on the part of their doctor. There-
fore, it seems more sensible to me, and I suspect congenial to Mutcherson, to 
provide better social support for all children with impairments rather than 
engage in a legal fiction that benefits only those who can find some negligent 
act of genetic diagnosis of their parents. Second, as I have argued elsewhere, if 
one is willing to uncouple the compensatory and deterrent functions of tort (as 
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A second point of agreement is that while my project has 
been to expose the intellectual problems with BIRC, I think 
Professor Mutcherson is correct that doing so is not sufficient to 
topple this discourse, and that I need to be more attuned to the 
political landscape, which admittedly was not the focus of my 
Articles. Moreover, I think she is right to be sensitive to the po-
litical use of anti-BIRC language and the fear that my argu-
ments will be misused by her political opponents. Sometimes 
we must press forward in an intellectually honest way even if 
our arguments will be co-opted by those we disagree with, but I 
think Professor Mutcherson is right that there are dangers 
here.  
Third, even while my greater ambition is to vanquish 
BIRC, whether or not I succeed, I completely agree with Profes-
sor Mutcherson that in the meantime it is worthwhile to pur-
sue taming best-interests discourse and co-opting it away from 
being used to support regulation we find repugnant. I also very 
much agree that the best-interests standard is abused even as 
to its deployment in analyzing the interests of existing children, 
though I think the problems are different and persist whether 
or not one accepts my critique of BIRC. 
Finally, I agree with many of the reproductive-justice ar-
guments that Professor Mutcherson makes for more social sup-
port and empathy for drug-using pregnant women. I merely 
think that those types of goals are worth pursuing for reasons 
disconnected from BIRC and the Non-Identity Problem. 
Now let me turn to our disagreements. 
IV.  DISAGREEMENTS   
A. THREE DISAGREEMENTS: POTENTIAL CHILDREN, POSITIVE 
LIBERTY, AND POLITICAL THEORY 
If I understand her Article correctly, I think Professor 
Mutcherson and I have three primary disagreements, although 
“disagreements” may be too strong a word since in each of these 
 
some theories of tort but not others are willing to do), it may be possible to jus-
tify providing monetary compensation to children in wrongful life cases, not 
because they have been harmed and deserve to be compensated, but because 
failing to do so will under-deter doctors operating in genetic-diagnosis practic-
es. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, 
and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 365–66 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Intentional Diminishment]. In other words, the children are transformed into 
a kind of private attorney general. See id. 
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places I think Professor Mutcherson may be talking past my 
Articles. 
1. Future Children vs. Potential Children, or Wanting the 
Best for the Children We Have vs. Wanting to Have the Best 
Children. 
Professor Mutcherson titles her Article “In Defense of Fu-
ture Children,” unintentionally, I believe, suggesting the preg-
nant negative (if you will pardon the pun) that my Articles are 
“in attack” or at least “in indifference” to future children. To 
understand why this is wrong, it is useful to distinguish future 
children from potential children. Future children are the chil-
dren we will have if our reproductive act takes place,31
 
 31. I am very explicit about this distinction in Regulating Reproduction, 
noting in a long passage: 
 whereas 
potential children are the universe of all children we possibly 
could have. At several points in her Article, Professor 
Mutcherson seems to suggest that I think parents or the state 
To make it clear exactly what it would mean to reject the non-person-
affecting principle approach as a justification for criminalizing certain 
reproductive conduct, I should emphasize what doing so would not 
imply. It does not imply that the State is prohibited from imposing 
criminal sanction to protect the interests of future persons who we 
know will exist and whose existence is independent of our sanction. 
Joel Feinberg gives an imaginative example of a criminal who plants 
a time bomb in the closet of a kindergarten and sets a timing device to 
go off six years hence. Eventually, the bomb goes off, “killing or muti-
lating dozens of five-year-old children.” As Feinberg rightly concludes, 
even though the criminal might deny he caused the harm to the chil-
dren because they did not exist when he performed the act of placing 
the bomb, that should be no excuse because his act “set in train a 
causal sequence that led directly to the harm.” Nothing I say in this 
Article is to the contrary. What is important for the kindergarten case 
is that there is no reason to think that whether or not we punish the 
criminal will determine whether these children come into existence. 
That is, it will not alter when, whether, or with whom their parents 
conceive. Thus, there is no Non-Identity Problem. These children will 
come into existence and these children will be harmed if the act is not 
deterred through criminal liability. Our cases are different, though, 
for the reasons we have been discussing throughout this Article—
whether or not we put in place criminal liability will determine 
whether these particular children come into existence, thus we cannot 
say that criminalizing the conduct prevents harm to these children, 
as we can in the time bomb case. For the same reason, rejecting crim-
inal liability for the cases this Article discusses does not require re-
jecting criminal liability for environmental damage or crimes against 
fetuses that will harm the children those fetuses will become. 
Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 4, at 484–85 (citations omitted) 
(quoting JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ES-
SAYS 12 (1992)). 
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should be indifferent as to how the children people have will 
fare. For example, she observes that, “from the perspective of 
many laypeople, one comes to owe something to a child to a 
significant degree well before a child or even a pregnancy 
comes to pass,” but that “[t]his reality is substantially missing 
from Cohen’s work.”32
What Professor Mutcherson appears not to grapple with is 
the distinction between wanting the best for the children we 
have versus wanting to have the best children. Rejecting BIRC 
and all of its alternatives does not at all imperil wanting the 
best for the children we have. Rejecting BIRC does, however, 
mean that the state cannot justify interventions aimed at pro-
ducing the best children of all the potential children we could 
have by claiming that doing so prevents harm or confers bene-
fits on those children. Instead, the state needs to have a differ-
ent non-BIRC theory to justify using tools like prohibition to 
press us to have the best children, such as non-person-affecting 
principles, reproductive externalities, etc. As I show in these 
two Articles, such theories run into many problems; they seem-
ingly justify mandatory enhancement and appear to be based 
on principles similar to the Nazi eugenics movement, among 
other problems. Professor Mutcherson lumps together future 
children and potential children and fails to distinguish between 
wanting the best for the children we have and wanting to have 
the best children. In so doing, she fails to confront these impli-
cations and in some ways recapitulates the same error with 
BIRC that my Article is meant to correct.
 Quite the contrary, I think parents 
should do everything possible to care for, love, and help make 
flourish the children they do have. 
33
2. Reproductive Rights or Reproductive Justice? Why Choose?! 
 
Professor Mutcherson suggests that “[u]ndergirding all of 
Cohen’s discussion in Beyond Best Interests is an understand-
ing of procreation as a fundamental right as articulated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma.”34
 
 32. Mutcherson, supra note 
 It is a minor 
point, but I think she is wrong about this. I mention Skinner 
3, at 61. 
 33. Curiously, in a footnote Professor Mutcherson labels as “disturbing” 
Julian Savulescu’s argument about a duty to enhance, but fails to explain how 
her own views avoid that implication, a point I explicitly raise in my articles. 
Id. at 62 n.56 (citing Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We 
Should Select the Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413 (2001)). 
 34. Id. at 50–51. 
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only very briefly at the end of Regulating Reproduction, and I 
explicitly avoid trying to resolve whether there is a fundamen-
tal right to become a genetic parent implicated by regulation of 
assisted reproduction. Moreover, I undertake the brief constitu-
tional analysis explicitly under the assumption that reproduc-
tion is not a fundamental right, and is thus reviewed only un-
der rational-basis review.35
Professor Mutcherson’s more general point, though, is that 
taking a “reproductive justice” lens (which she contrasts with 
more rights-talk oriented approaches) might take my project in 
a quite different direction.
 
36 She nicely captures the emphasis 
of this approach in suggesting that its goal is to ensure that all 
people have “‘the economic, social, and political power and re-
sources to make healthy decisions about [their] bodies, sexuali-
ty and reproduction for [them]selves and [their] communi-
ties.’”37
 
 35. Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 
 In Regulating Reproduction and Beyond Best Interests, I 
do consider some regulations of reproduction that might be 
thought of as particularly salient to those offering reproductive-
justice critiques, such as restrictions on single-parent reproduc-
tion, on state insurance coverage, and on enforcement of surro-
gacy agreements. Indeed, in both papers I make much of the 
fact that several of the BIRC alternatives would make current 
patterns of reproductive regulation underinclusive, or in other 
words, discriminatory. But Professor Mutcherson is surely cor-
rect that there are more examples of state reproductive policies 
4, at 514–19. The one 
place where more normative conceptions of rights to procreate take on in-
creased prominence is in my analysis of “Imperfect Non-Identity Problems,” 
where I noted, referencing John Robertson’s work,  
If one believes in a broad and important conception of pro-creative 
liberty, or otherwise finds important the parental interests impinged 
on by the interventions discussed above, the appropriate tradeoff be-
tween parental interests and children’s welfare in these imperfect 
cases should clearly and conclusively tilt against intervention. One 
would already demand a quite significant showing of detriment to 
child welfare to justify restrictions here absent the Non-Identity Prob-
lem, and whatever showing is made will have to be discounted by the 
much smaller number and probability of children who will be harmed. 
Id. at 477 (citations omitted). I then, however, go on to address the implica-
tions for those who hold quite different views. Id. 
 36. I will note that as a matter of nomenclature I would not divide rights 
from justice in this way. One way in which individuals will face injustice is if 
the state limits a right they have without good reason. 
 37. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 52 (quoting A New Vision for Advancing 
Our Movement for Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Reproductive 
Justice, FORWARD TOGETHER, at 1, http:// forwardtogether.org/assets/docs/AC 
RJ-A-New-Vision.pdf (last visited July 12, 2012)). 
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that have disparate effects on women of color, among others.  
Why focus on what I do, rather than on the examples of 
children born at low birthweights, without health insurance, or 
abused or neglected, as Professor Mutcherson suggests? It is 
not because I think these categories of regulation are unim-
portant; quite the contrary. Rather, it is because the philosoph-
ical problems I identify with BIRC reasoning are not particu-
larly salient to these issues. As Professor Mutcherson (and also 
Professor Alvaré) notes, even as applied to existing children, 
best interests is a problematic concept that is often wielded in 
ways that disproportionately target poor women of color. These 
problems, however, are not my focus in these two Articles. My 
critique in the pre-conception area is a logically prior problem. 
The problem I identify is one that even the best-articulated and 
applied best-interests analysis would not evade. In this sense, I 
really do think Professor Mutcherson and I are more “yes and” 
not “yes but.” 
Professor Mutcherson also observes that “BIRC is not just 
about the who, what, and when of procreation. It is profoundly 
and disturbingly about staking out claims of worthiness, about 
who deserves to be a full and complete member of the polity, 
and the meanings of citizenship and human dignity.”38 I do not 
disagree at all. And, indeed, at several points in my two Arti-
cles, I discuss the ways in which the potential BIRC alterna-
tives I canvass have very disturbing implications as to the 
worth and dignity of those with disabilities, those who choose to 
remain unmarried, and LGBT populations, among others. 
When Professor Mutcherson observes that “the community el-
ement of the justice narrative suggests that discussions about 
procreation are not simply about a contest of clashing rights 
and radical autonomy involving atomistic individuals, but also 
involve questions of interdependence, obligation, and relation-
ship,”39 I again do not disagree. My discussion of Wronging 
While Overall Benefitting and Reproductive Externalities is 
explicitly aimed at arguments for regulating reproduction tied 
to obligations and interdependence.40
For similar reasons I have not focused on Professor 
Mutcherson’s worry about “what remains to obligate the state 




 38. Id. at 53–54. 
 I 
 39. Id. at 54. 
 40. Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 5, at 1217–64. 
 41. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 57. 
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understand this concern to map more onto to positive- rather 
than negative-liberty claims,42 though I recognize the dichoto-
my simplifies much. Otherwise said, assuming one agrees with 
me that BIRC is not a viable way of justifying negative-liberty 
restrictions on reproductive decision making, one could, con-
sistent with that conclusion, endorse a large number of possible 
approaches to the state’s obligation to provide support; any-
thing from no support to maximal support for children who do 
come into existence would be possible.43
3. Parental Choices vs. State Regulation 
 In other words, if this 
is what holds Professor Mutcherson back from rejecting BIRC, 
she need not fear, in that the rejection of BIRC does not hold a 
clear implication for this question. 
Professor Mutcherson writes, “Also largely missing from 
Cohen’s work is clear acknowledgement that having children is 
a choice fairly subject to an ethical analysis that has policy-
making implications.”44
 
 42. The locus classic is ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBER-
TY 170 (2004). 
 I disagree, in that the two Articles con-
sider eight (including BIRC) possible ethical/public policy justi-
fications for regulating reproduction and spend close to 200 
pages examining them. But I think this disagreement is better 
captured when Professor Mutcherson suggests that what I have 
missed is a point from an essay by Laura Purdy that she 
 43. Cf. Cohen, Rights Not to Procreate, supra note 11, at 1139–48 (explain-
ing why recognizing a right to be a genetic, legal, or gestational parent does 
not necessarily require recognizing a right not to be a genetic, legal, or gesta-
tional parent). This point is nicely captured in an exchange between Michael 
Sandel and Frances Kamm on the morality of human enhancement. Sandel 
expresses the worry that if enhancement is permitted, individuals who fail to 
enhance themselves, and therefore have larger needs for public assistance, 
will not receive that help because social solidarity will be eroded. Michael 
Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2004, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2004/04/sandel.htm. 
Kamm responds that it does not follow that our entitlement to social support 
will be diminished in the case of our (or our parent’s) choice not to enhance, 
because our entitlement to support may be independent of choices we make. 
As she writes, “These are conceptually two separate issues. For example, sup-
pose someone is at fault for acting carelessly in using his hairdryer. If he suf-
fers severe damage and will die without medical treatment, his being at fault 
in a minor way does not mean that he forfeits a claim on others he otherwise 
had to free medical care.” Frances M. Kamm, Is There a Problem with En-
hancement?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 12 (2005). This follows even more clearly if 
it was a choice the child is not responsible for, as in the cases of procreative 
decisions by her parents that are the focus of my articles. 
 44. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 54. 
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quotes: “‘If we are consistent in our concern about human hap-
piness, it seems clear that we must attend to the welfare of fu-
ture people,’ which in Purdy’s case, means rejecting the impli-
cations of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem.”45
In the same vein she points to a new book published by 
Christine Overall (published after Regulating Reproduction) 
that “ponders why it is that people are often called on to justify 
why they are childless, but are much less frequently asked why 
they have opted to have children.”
  
46 She explains Overall’s posi-
tion as being that “[i]n other words, what matters from the per-
spective of a parent is whether the child is the first child, se-
cond child, etc. and this identity category is not determined by 
what sperm and egg combination comes together at any point 
in time. If Overall is right, then the non-identity problem is not 
really a problem at all, but I suspect that Cohen does not be-
lieve that Overall is right.”47 Finally, Mutcherson questions “if 
we jettison BIRC, as Cohen suggests, what remains to anchor 
any public concerns about procreation other than the slim teth-
er of reproductive externalities?”48
Let me make a few points in response to all of this. First, 
one should be careful to distinguish the personal ethical ques-
tion of whether a person has done something wrong by engag-
ing in a particular act of reproduction from the legal/political 
theoretical question of whether the state may use some of the 
means of regulating reproduction that I identify to influence or 
prevent those same reproductive choices. The answer to one 
question might track the answer to the other, but it need not, 
and my two Articles are pretty squarely focused on the latter 
issue. Indeed, I note in several spots (such as in my discussion 
of non-person-affecting principles or virtue ethics or wronging 
while overall benefitting) that various theories of the domain of 
law and the state may render unjustifiable some means of regu-
lation, even if individuals think, as a matter of personal ethics, 





 45. Id. at 55 (quoting Laura M. Purdy, Loving Future People, in REPRO-
DUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 301 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995)). 
 Overall, whose new book Mutcherson relies on, is also 
very explicit in making the same point, noting that “in speak-
 46. Id. at 56 (citing CHRISTINE OVERALL, WHY HAVE CHILDREN?: THE 
ETHICAL DEBATE (2012)). 
 47. Id. (citations omitted).  
 48. Id. at 57. 
 49. See Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 4, at 504–13, 518–19; 
Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 5, at 1260–64, 1272. 
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ing of a possible obligation not to have children, I am saying 
nothing about what the state should or should not do to curtail 
protection. That is a matter of social policy, which I am setting 
aside in this book.”50
To put the point a different way, many people hold beliefs, 
often as a moral matter, that would not meet the demands of 
public reason. Indeed, some might label these beliefs irrational 
(for some, certain religious beliefs would be an example). Take, 
for example, certain religious mandates against eating pork. A 
conclusion that the state should not ban the consumption of 
pork would resolve the political theoretical/legal question. But 
this does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that individuals 
would be wrong to choose on their own to refrain from eating 
pork. Thus, the resolution of the personal ethical question does 
not necessarily track the resolution of the theoretical/legal 
question. In the reproductive area, the better way to think of 
this is as a two-step process. First, we determine which forms 
of reproductive regulation the state can justifiably forbid or dis-
courage, and only then, in the space that remains, do personal 
moral choices about reproduction come to the fore. Thus, there 
is a large space between a conclusion “X is immoral” and “the 
state should make X illegal or otherwise discourage it.” Lying is 
a good example of an immoral action that is still far from state 
regulation. Therefore, even if one thought the parents 
Mutcherson identifies were acting immorally, it would not fol-
low (absent significant additional argumentation) that the state 
would be justified in prohibiting or otherwise discouraging the-
se reproductive practices. Relatedly, nothing I have said in my 
Articles has suggested that individuals should seek to have 
children or that the state should encourage them to do so. In-
stead, my focus has been on when the state can justifiably in-
terfere with those who want to have children.  
 
Finally, to the extent Professor Mutcherson’s fear is that if 
we reject BIRC she does not know “what remains to anchor any 
public concerns about procreation other than the slim tether of 
reproductive externalities,”51
 
 50. OVERALL, supra note 
 I have two responses. First, she 
might find satisfying one of the six other justifications for re-
productive regulation, besides BIRC or Reproductive Externali-
ties, that I have identified and analyzed. While I would be over-
joyed to think I have been so convincing in my criticisms of 
these approaches that Professor Mutcherson finds them un-
46, at 118 (emphasis added). 
 51. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 57. 
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thinkable, in my own mind what I have done is to show some of 
their difficult and disturbing implications, rather than offer a 
thoroughgoing and undeniable rejection. It may be that Profes-
sor Mutcherson would rather accept some of these theories’ im-
plications as to eugenics or enhancement, for example, if it 
means she would have a BIRC alternative that would satisfy 
her.  
Second, I would like to urge Professor Mutcherson to re-
verse her polarity. She seems to want to start with a regulation 
of reproduction, assume it must be justified, and for that reason 
reject any analysis that would leave the regulation unjustified 
even if one cannot find the soft point in my analysis (for it must 
be there!). Given the huge variance in the forms of reproduction 
that have been regulated over history and around the world, 
and insofar as Professor Mutcherson and the other commenta-
tors recognize that BIRC or other theories can be a coded justi-
fication for the oppression of minorities or other unacceptable 
leitmotifs, I want to suggest that it may be worthwhile to take a 
different approach. We should start by finding out which (if 
any) theories for regulating reproduction we can endorse in 
what circumstances, and let that guide what regulations to en-
act, not vice versa. That has been my ambition in this work. 
B. WHAT EXACTLY IS PROFESSOR MUTCHERSON’S VIEW? 
Professor Mutcherson’s twenty-one pages of response are 
quite coy on her own views about when the state is justified in 
regulating reproduction. I am fairly explicit that I reject BIRC, 
and explain why I find the other theories I describe or invent 
also problematic, though I think that the Reproductive Exter-
nalities justification is the best of a bad lot and may justify 
regulation in a few cases. As the professorial adage goes, it 
takes a theory to beat a theory, so I question just what theory 
Professor Mutcherson is endorsing. Given that she is writing a 
response to my own Articles, it might be a bit unfair to press 
too hard on her failure to cast her die with one of the eight the-
ories I articulate, and I am hopeful she will write more on this 
issue in her future work. For now, let me instead identify and 
discuss three very different theories that appear at various 
points in her response. 
Early on, Professor Mutcherson appears to actually want to 
save/retain a version of the BIRC view. While she does not ex-
plicitly champion it, she does seem sympathetic to a position 
pertaining to birth order that she associates with Professor 
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Overall’s book. As Mutcherson describes the approach, that 
“what matters from the perspective of a parent is whether the 
child is the first child, second child, etc. and this identity cate-
gory is not determined by what sperm and egg combination 
comes together at any point in time.”52
Why this birth-order approach will not work as a justifica-
tion for state regulation of reproduction is easiest to see as to 
regulation aimed at altering whether individuals reproduce, 
such as limitations on same-sex or older-parental use of repro-
ductive technologies. It is hard to adopt a relational view, be-
cause the state is blocking the formation of any relation, by 
blocking the conception of any child, whether first, second, or 
third in birth order. It would seem as though the birth-order 
approach is just beside the point. Therefore a reformulation of 
BIRC on the birth-order view will not save most of the regula-
tions of reproduction I have discussed, since they restrict 
whether individuals can reproduce at all. 
 While this response es-
say is not an appropriate place to fully respond to Overall’s ex-
cellent new book, let me say a few words about why this partic-
ular response to the Non-Identity Problem will not work as a 
defense of a BIRC-based justification for the state’s regulation 
of reproduction, especially since this birth-order view is one 
that others have informally offered in reaction to my Articles 
during workshops. Here, it is again useful to disentangle the 
grounds justifying when the state may interfere with private 
reproductive choices from the way that some parents some-
times think about their children.  
Next, consider attempts to alter with whom individuals re-
produce. Let me tell you about my family, not out of exhibition-
istic desire, but to illustrate the problem with the birth-order 
view: I am the second born in my family. I have a brother, Jon, 
and my mother (Ethel, although she now calls herself Ginger) 
was married (to Jeffrey) once before she married my father 
(Bert), but without any children. Imagine that after having 
produced my older brother Jon, my mother went back to her 
first husband and had a son with him instead. That boy, call 
him Gabriel, who would have resulted from reproduction be-
tween Ethel and Jeffrey, would be Ethel’s second child, just as 
in the real world I, Glenn (or I. Glenn according to my official 
documents!) am her second child. According to the birth-order 
view, to determine if I (Glenn) have been harmed by my exist-
 
 52. Id. at 56 (citing OVERALL, supra note 46, at 153). 
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ence in a way that justifies state intervention, we should com-
pare my life to the one that Gabriel would have had, because 
the real question is whether my mother harmed her “second 
child” by conceiving him with one man versus the other. This 
seems like a very strange view in that it treats the children 
from two different fathers as possible substitutes for one an-
other, but only if they both happen to be the second child in the 
birth order, rather than one being second and one being third, 
for example. Why should birth order be given such prominence? 
As further proof of the implausibility of the view, consider this: 
in the example I gave, Gabriel and Glenn would each be my 
mother’s “second child,” but Glenn would be Bert’s “second 
child” while Gabriel would be Jeffrey’s “first child.” According 
to this view, does that mean that we are allowed to compare 
those two lives in determining if Glenn is harmed or not, be-
cause the birth order is only the same for one genetic parent? 
For these reasons, focusing on birth order does not seem a 
plausible way of saving BIRC for cases in which the state aims 
at altering with whom we reproduce. 
Finally, there are the cases of state attempts to alter when 
individuals reproduce. I only have one primary example of this 
in my Articles, abstinence education, so even if the birth-order 
view made a difference here, most of my claims in those Arti-
cles would remain unscathed. In any event, the birth-order 
view seems no more persuasive here than elsewhere, because it 
is unclear why the sperm-and-egg combination would matter 
for with whom we reproduce but not when we reproduce. The 
point can also be made with a thought experiment, albeit one 
that is a bit more complex than for the other two types of regu-
lations of reproduction. Suppose a husband and wife use In 
Vitro Fertilization (IVF) to fertilize two preembryos (each of 
which is a different sperm-and-egg combination, but from the 
same genetic parents). They are choosing which preembryo to 
implant, which we can think of as analogous to deciding when 
to reproduce, in that what changes is the sperm-and-egg com-
bination from the same genetic parents. Suppose one 
preembryo will produce a boy with deafness, while the other 
will produce a girl without that impairment. If the parents 
choose to implant the first preembryo to produce the boy, can 
they be said to have harmed him, to have acted against his best 
interests? His complaint would have to be “you have harmed 
me by having me; instead I should have been a hearing girl.” 
But I think we would respond, “No, if we had had a girl without 
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deafness we would not have had you,” which is analogous to 
what courts actually say in wrongful life cases, as my Articles 
note. But a proponent of the birth-order view might retort: “you 
are ignoring the birth order, the relevant category is ‘first child’ 
not ‘this child.’” As a purely descriptive matter, I suspect many 
parents actually think of “first son” and “first daughter” quite 
differently, so I am not sure that is right. In any event, the 
problem runs deeper, for suppose the parents implant the fe-
male preembryo first, making her their “first child.” If they 
then also later implant the second preembryo, it becomes their 
“second child,” and the relation identified by the birth-order 
view seems to disappear. It seems strange to think the child is 
harmed in a world where the preembryo chosen is the only one 
implanted but not in a world where it is implanted after a prior 
preembryo. I apologize in advance if this last bit of the discus-
sion is confusing, but I think the confusion stems from trying to 
fit a square peg (the birth-order view) into a round hole (the 
grounds for which a state can justifiably prohibit reproductive 
acts).  
So much for saving BIRC through the birth-order view. 
Perhaps anticipating these types of criticisms, Professor 
Mutcherson seems to shift to a virtue-ethics approach later in 
her Article. As she recognizes, in Beyond Best Interests I note 
that “virtue ethics has the benefit that it can, if wielded correct-
ly, circumvent the non-identity problem because it does not rely 
on any reference to the well-being of a future child, but only the 
moral character of the parent or potential parent,” but that 
“where a reference to the moral virtue of a parent measures 
that virtue in part by reference to the flourishing of a future 
child, non-identity once again rears its head.”53 Still, she thinks 
that I “may be too quick to reject the insights of virtue ethics or 
the extent to which this branch of inquiry closely tracks the 
root of much policymaking” because “[t]itle notwithstanding, 
BIRC is not solely about a child and it certainly need not be re-
duced to any given child and any given set of parental decision 
makers.”54 Instead, Professor Mutcherson states that BIRC “is 
a stand in for a larger conversation about the nature of repro-
ductive responsibility, a concept certainly as slippery and mal-
leable as the concept of the best interests of a (real or imagined) 
child.”55
 
 53. Id. at 59. 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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In Beyond Best Interests, I suggest three difficulties with 
virtue-ethics approaches to justify the reproductive regulations 
I discuss: (1) any view tying the wrongfulness of reproductive 
action to the flourishing of the resulting child depends on some 
notion of harm and benefit to that child, which is rendered 
problematic by the Non-Identity Problem; (2) there are clashing 
conceptions of parental virtue at work here, and one might just 
as plausibly defend these parents as the virtuous ones for (to 
borrow from Michael Sandel’s work) being humble, open to the 
unbidden, and resisting the pull of mastery, as opposed to pur-
suing eugenic or at least perfectionist aims for their children; 
and (3) it is unclear whether conceptions of virtue divorced 
from harm and benefit can form the justificatory basis for legal 
regulation rather than merely serve as a marker for moral 
wrongfulness, especially as to criminal law.56
A few paragraphs later we have what reads like it may be 
the articulation of Professor Mutcherson’s actual position, 
namely that “[r]eproductive responsibility and BIRC as some 
faction of evaluating that responsibility is ubiquitous and it 
speaks to the fact that BIRC is not strictly about logic or rea-
son, but it resonates instinctively with people precisely because 
it takes seriously, as a normative matter, the idea that one can 
act wrongly by procreating.”
 Professor 
Mutcherson seems to concede my first critique, seems support-
ive of the second, and says nothing about the third. Despite her 
labeling, it is hard to understand this as a full-throated en-
dorsement by her of virtue ethics views, and in any event she 
has not responded to my critiques. 
57 This seems very close to the 
BIRC alternative I call “Wronging While Overall Benefitting,” 
which claims that, even though the individual who is brought 
into existence has been made (all things considered) better off 
by the act of reproduction, one can still claim he has been 
wronged (in a deontological sense) by the act of reproduction, 
especially if his parents refuse to take responsibility. I spend 
roughly twenty pages of Beyond Best Interests explaining this 
view, using the elegant version of this approach put forth by 
Seana Shiffrin as my main interlocutor, and then explaining 
why I think it will not work.58
 
 56. Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 
 What holds me back from think-
ing this is the view that Professor Mutcherson actually sub-
scribes to is the fact that she does not cite Shiffrin’s Article, 
5, at 1269–73. 
 57. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 60. 
 58. Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 5, at 1244–64. 
COHEN 10/4/2012 8:51 AM 
2012] RESPONSE 23 
 
reference this discussion, or attempt to respond to my criti-
cisms of it, which makes me think this cannot be where she 
wants to hang her hat. 
While it would probably be unfair to expect Professor 
Mutcherson to articulate a fully fleshed-out theory of when the 
state can regulate reproduction in a twenty-one-page response 
paper, at the end of the day, I am not sure where she stands at 
all, nor do I think she has struck any significant blows to the 
argumentation I have offered against BIRC and many of its al-
ternatives. 
C. SO WHAT? 
Finally, Professor Mutcherson pushes the question of 
whether anything I say in these Articles really matters. She 
suggests that “[I do] not successfully capture the extent to 
which BIRC is an expression of a larger and intuitively persua-
sive view of the basic requirements of human goodness and a 
prerequisite to many accounts of human flourishing and human 
obligation.”59
It is because of BIRC that women begin to take pre-natal vitamins 
while trying to become pregnant. It is BIRC that drives families to 
move to bigger homes in good school districts in anticipation of having 
a child. BIRC drives future fathers to begin smoking cessation pro-
grams so that they can become non-smokers before their future child 
is conceived.
 As evidence she points out: 
60
Let me put to one side the fact that I doubt that all things 
that are “intuitively persuasive” are true, that I am a much 
bigger believer in reflective equilibrium, and that it is precisely 
because it is “intuitively persuasive” but also (in my view) 
wrong that I want to dethrone BIRC. In any event, it is not en-
tirely clear to me why Professor Mutcherson thinks that my ar-
gument renders BIRC problematic in any of these contexts. 
Remember that I argue in these Articles only that BIRC is 
problematic as a justification for altering when, whether, or 
with whom individuals reproduce in the sense of conception. It 
is not clear to me that any of these cases alters when, whether, 
or with whom individuals conceived. Instead, most of the cases 
that seem to concern her are about harms to already conceived 
fetuses being carried by their mothers. In my Articles I am ex-
plicit that accepting my claims regarding state regulation of 
conception does not necessarily mean that the state cannot jus-
 
 
 59. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 58. 
 60. Id. at 60.  
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tifiably regulate maternal behavior while carrying a fetus,61
Further, I am very purposefully not claiming that “whatev-
er acts one commits during the process of creating new life are 
not wholly morally repugnant so long as the life being brought 
into being is not without worth.”
 
such that it is strange that most of the examples Professor 
Mutcherson chooses are about harms to fetuses. 
62 This is both because the 
Non-Identity Problem does not render problematic BIRC argu-
ments for condemning every “act[] one commits during the pro-
cess of creating new life”63
Moreover, it is also possible that even if parents accept my 
denunciation of BIRC, many will continue to want to do a myr-
iad of pre-conception activities that will ensure their offspring 
are of higher welfare than the offspring they would have had if 
they had engaged in other behavior. What my analysis does is 
force them to reckon with the possibility that they want these 
higher-welfare children not for the sake of the child’s best in-
terest, but because it furthers their own best interests. It is not 
clear to me that there is anything inherently wrong with that. 
It only looks wrong as against a fairy tale (albeit one often 
based on assumptions about motherly altruism that might 
make some cringe) where we portray the decision to conceive as 
an entirely selfless enterprise. If people want to ignore what I 
have said and continue to adopt views they cannot defend 
through reasoned argument, again, I have no serious beef with 
them; we as a society tolerate a wide range of un-reasoned be-
liefs in personal decisions. I become uncomfortable when the 
state uses logic that it cannot defend to prevent individuals 
from making certain reproductive decisions they would like to 
make. 
 that produce lives worth living, and 
because BIRC is not the final possible word on the matter, and 
because, again, we should distinguish government regulation 
from personal choices.  
Again, I want to emphasize that with Professor 
Mutcherson, as with the other commentators, we agree on 
much more than we disagree. With Professor Mutcherson, in 
particular, I share a large number of prior political commit-
 
 61. Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 4, at 441–42, 484–85. On 
the applicability of the Non-Identity Problem to post-conception but pre-birth 
decisions and harms, see also Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, supra note 
30, at 349–59. 
 62. Mutcherson, supra note 3, at 61. 
 63. Id. 
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ments about reproduction, such that mapping where we diverge 
from quite-common starting points is particularly revealing.  
  CONCLUSION   
I am extremely grateful to all of these commentators. Each 
writes work I hungrily consume and learn from, and I am grati-
fied by the careful attention they have paid to my own work. I 
am also happy that, perhaps for different reasons, they agree 
with me that the Best Interests of the Resulting Child rheto-
ric—which has dominated much of the discourse and has been 
my target in this work—is deeply problematic. It would be bet-
ter to move beyond best interests and to face the more difficult 
questions about the state’s justification for regulating repro-
duction that this construct hides. Thus, the title of this reply 
refers not only to my goal (to bury best-interests discourse in 
terms of regulating reproduction), but also to the psychoanalyt-
ic sense of “bury”: that which we repress with our conscious 
mind nonetheless can maintain a strong pull on us, it may be 
forgotten but not gone, and my goal is to bring it into the light.  
 
